

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W

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P R 080750Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 707

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 124

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0467

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD

NOV 25-DEC 1, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. MOVING AT THIS WEEK'S INFORMAL MEETING TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IN VIENNA, THE EAST PRESENTED A WRITTEN PROPOSAL TO FREEZE ALL GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALL AD HOC GROUP REPS CONSIDERED THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL TO BE CONTRARY TO WESTERN INTERESTS AS IT WOULD FREEZE AND CODIFY BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WOULD RESULT IN NATIONAL

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SUB-CEILINGS AND WAS VAGUE AND UNWORKABLE DUE TO

EASTERN REFUSAL TO PROVIDE FORCE LEVEL DATA. ALLIED REPS TOOK THIS PRELIMINARY LINE IN CRITICIZING THE FREEZE PROPOSAL AT THE NOV 26 INFORMAL MEETING. HOWEVER, SEVERAL ALLIED REPS WERE RELUCTANT DEFINITELY TO REJECT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OUT OF CONCERN FOR POSSIBLE NEGATIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSEQUENCES ONCE THE EAST EVENTUALLY DIVULGES THE FREEZE PROPOSAL TO THE PRESS. AT WEEKS'S END, SOME ALLIES WERE SUGGESTING, IN VIENNA AND AT NATO BRUSSELS, THAT A POSSIBLE COUNTER-PROPOSAL COULD BE FORMULATED TO PROMOTE WESTERN INTERESTS.

2. THE WEST ALSO MOVED DURING THIS WEEK'S INFORMAL TO PRESENT IT OFFER FOR A NO-INCREASE PROVISION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER. BOTH SIDES PRESENTED STATEMENTS AT THE NOV 28 PLENARY MEETING. AND THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED A YEAR'S-END REPORT TO NAC ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF AND PROSPECTS FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING THE NEGATIVE WESTERN REACTION TO THEIR OCT 15 INITIAL STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL, AND PARTICULARLY THE ALLIED REJECTION OF THAT PROPOSAL AT THE NOV 14 PLENARY MEETING, THE EAST MOVED THIS WEEK TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE VIENNA TALKS BY TABLING A WRITTEN PROPOSAL TO FREEZE ALL GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV TABLED THE WRITTEN TEXT OF A DRAFT COMMITMENT, OF WHICH THE UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION PREPARED BY THE SOVIETS, READS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT: THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, (FOLLOWED BY ALPHABETICAL LIST OF ALL REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS) WHICH ARE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS ON SUCH A REDUCTION, GUIDED BY A DESIRE TO SUPPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE WITH MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATION-  
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SHIP AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, DESIRING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS OF SPECIFIC RESULTS AND TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH MAY HAMPER THIS, DECLARE THAT THEY HEREBY UNDERTAKE NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT.

5. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, KHLESTOV STATED THAT THE WORDS "THEIR FORCES" IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE PROPOSAL REFERRED SOLELY TO MANPOWER, THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS SUGGESTING A FREEZE ONLY IN THE AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, AND THAT NEITHER ARMAMENTS NOR EQUIPMENT WOULD BE COVERED. THE CORRECT ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE DECLARATORY PHRASE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS "NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE..."

6. FOLLOWING BRIEF CONSULTATION AMONG ALLIED REPS, US REP REPLIED THAT THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE ALLIED REPS ON THIS PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT WAS NOT A PROPOSAL FOR EQUITABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AIMED AT CORRECTING THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA AND MOVING TOWARDS GROUND FORCE PARITY. INSTEAD, THE PROPOSAL WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE THE PRESENT INEQUITABLE EAST-WEST GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP AND CREATE A NEGATIVE PRECEDENT FOR SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO HAVE THE RESULT OF ESTABLISHING NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS -- WHICH THE ALLIES OPPOSED. MOREOVER, THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT WORKABLE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON THE FORCE LEVELS IN THE AREA; THE EAST HAD CHALLENGED WESTERN TOTALS AND HAD AT THE SAME TIME REFUSED TO EXCHANGE DATA IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT AGREED TOTALS.

7. FRG REP SAID THAT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE EASTERN REFUSAL TO EXCHANGE DATA WERE HIGHLIGHTED BY THE FREEZE PROPOSAL. DRAWING ON NEW NATO GUIDANCE, THE FRG REP THEN PRESENTED THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A MUTUAL

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W

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P R 030750Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 708  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 125  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0467

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER,  
IN THE AREA, OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE FRG REP  
POINTED OUT THAT, WITH THIS STEP, THE ALLIES HAD MOVED  
TO COVER ALL MANPOWER IN THE AREA WITH THE AGREED  
EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY, AND THAT THE ALLIED PROPOSAL TO  
COMBINE NO INCREASE COMMITMENTS WITH PHASE I REDUCTIONS,  
MOVING TOWARDS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES,  
WAS A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THE EASTERN PRO-  
POSAL OF AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD FORCE FREEZE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO ALTERED REMARKS ON THE EASTERN FREEZE  
PROPOSAL, KHESTOV URGED ALLIED REPS TO GIVE IT FURTHER  
CONSIDERATION, DESPITE THEIR INITIAL NEGATIVE REACTION.

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9. ALLIED DISCUSSION THIS WEEK IN THE AD HOC GROUP,  
AS WELL AS AT NATO, EVIDENCED A BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG  
THE ALLIES THAT THE EASTERN MANPOWER FREEZE PROPOSAL  
WAS CONTRARY TO WESTERN INTERESTS, UNACCEPTABLE AND  
PROBABLY DESIGNED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THERE  
WAS BROAD AGREEMENT THAT THE ALLIED REPS HAD, AT THE  
NOV 26 INFORMAL, CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THE MAIN DEFECTS  
OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL -- PARTICULARLY THE PROPOSED  
FREEZING AND CODIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL PACT  
ADVANTAGE IN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

10. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF REPS WERE OPPOSED TO  
REJECTING OUTRIGHT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, PREFERRING  
INSTEAD TO REBUT IT THROUGH PROBING QUESTIONS THAT  
WOULD CONFIRM ITS NEGATIVE FEATURES, OR TO ADVANCE AN  
ALLIED COUNTER-PROPOSAL. SEVERAL ALLIED REPS WERE  
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE APPEAL

OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL FOR PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN THEIR COUNTRIES, WITH THE BELGIAN REP NOTING AN ANALOGOUS SUGGESTION MADE BY FORMER FONMIN HARMEL JUST PRIOR TO THE 1968 SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WHILE THE EAST HAS NOT YET DIVULGED THEIR FREEZE PROPOSAL TO THE PRESS, AHG REPS CONSIDERED IT INEVITABLE THAT THE EAST WOULD DO DO AND ALSO WOULD PRESENT THEIR PROPOSAL AT THE LATEST IN THE FINAL DEC 12 PLENARY SESSION OF THIS ROUND, AS WELL AS IN THE WRAP UP PRESS CONFERENCE.

11. IN AHG AND NATO DISCUSSION, THE UK AND FRG REPS FAVORED A COUNTER-PROPOSAL THAT WOULD REQUIRE, INTER ALIA, THAT THE EAST PROVIDE THE CURRENT FORCE LEVEL DATA REQUISITE TO ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF A FREEZE. UK REP CLAIMED THAT THE EAST WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO MEET WESTERN DEMANDS FOR DATA, AND THUS WOULD EXPOSE THE HOLLOWNESS OF THEIR PROPOSAL; ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD THE EAST ADVANCE SERIOUS FORCE LEVEL DATA, EXISTING GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES WOULD HAVE BEEN DEMONSTRATED, AND THE CASE FOR A COMMON CEILING ENHANCED. IN INITIAL AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSIONS, US REP STRESSED THE ADVERSE FEATURES OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL AND THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST OF AN EFFECTIVE AND PROMPT, NEGATIVE ALLIED  
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RESPONSE DESIGNED TO MOVE DISCUSSION BACK TOWARD WESTERN NEGOTIATING GOALS.

12. AT THE NOV 29 AHG AND NAC MEETINGS, THE ALLIES AGREED TO REFER TO THEIR PRELIMINARY NEGATIVE REACTIONS SHOULD THE EAST RAISE THE FREEZE PROPOSAL AT THE DEC 3 INFORMAL; THE ALLIES WOULD ALSO PRESS THEIR OWN AIR NO-INCREASE OFFER AND THE NEED FOR DATA EXCHANGE AT THE DEC 3 INFORMAL. NATO WILL BE ADDRESSING THE CONSIDERED ALLIED REACTION TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL STARTING DEC 2, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED POSITION AT THE FINAL INFORMAL OF THE ROUND ON DEC 10.

13. IN INITIAL BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH AHG REPS ON THE SUBJECT, EASTERN REPS SOUGHT TO DRAW THE ALLIES INTO ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THEIR FREEZE PROPOSAL AND INTO DISCUSSION OF ITS DETAILS. THE SOVIET REP INDICATED FLEXIBILITY ON THE DURATION OF THE FREEZE, STATING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FIDICULTY IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON A FREEZE LASTING "ONE, TWO, OR THREE YEARS, IF THAT WOULD SUIT YOU BETTER."

14. AT THE NOV 28 PLENARY MEETING, THE LUXEMBOURG AND POLISH REPS DELIVERED STATEMENTS. THE LUXEMBOURG

STATEMENT WAS A PRESENTATION ON THE COMMON CEILING AND THE NEED FOR DATA EXCHANGE. THE POLISH STATEMENT CONTAINED A DETAILED REJOINDER TO THE NOV 14 WESTERN CITIQUE OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL. IT WAS DESIGNED TO KEEP THAT PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A MAN-POWER FREEZE.

15. THE AD HOC GROUP THIS WEEK ALSO APPROVED A REPORT TO THE NAC ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE REPORT, WHICH INCLUDED A BRIEF NEGATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, CONCLUDED BY POSITING TWO POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE ALLIES: (A) CONTINUING TO ELABORATE DETAILS OF THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION WHILE MAINTAINING ITS SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS, OR (B) ADDING FURTHER ELEMENTS TO THE ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR WESTERN REDUCTIONS AS AN INDUCEMENT TO  
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THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. THE AHG REPORT STATES THAT OPTION (A) HOLDS OUT LITTLE PROSPECT FOR MAKING MUCH PROGRESS IN VIENNA TOWARDS AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, BUT NOTES THAT THIS COURSE MIGHT BE JUSTIFIED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATION OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF MBFR. AS FOR OPTION (B), THE GROUP ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT SUCH "FURTHER ELEMENTS" WOULD INVOKE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM THE EAST, BUT ADDED THAT UNTIL THIS HAS BEEN RIED THOROUGHLY, THE ALLIES WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE TO WHAT EXTENT THE EAST WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS.

16. COMMENT. THE DELEGATION CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL FOR THE ALLIES TO REPLY TO THE EASTERN MANPOWER FREEZE PROPOSAL IN SOME DEFINITIVE WAY NO LATER THAN THE FINAL INFORMAL MEETING OF THIS ROUND ON DEC 10. FOR THE ALLIES NOT TO REPLY UNTIL AFTER THE CHRISTMAS BREAK, WHICH COMMENCES DEC 12, WOULD LEAVE THE EAST WITH THE INITIATIVE, WOULD BE A DEMONSTRATION OF ALLIED DISUNITY, AND WOULD PERMIT THE EAST TO HAVE THE MONOPOLY OVER PUBLICITY FOR ITS MANPOWER FREEZE PROPOSAL. END COMMENT.RESOR

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